1.  What was Socrates' mission, as he understood it?  What all did it involved?  What was he trying to accomplish?  What changes was he trying to bring about?

2.  What was the 'problem' in his fellow Athenians that he was trying to address (e.g., in Euthyphro)?

3.  How specifically did he go about it?  What all did it involve?

4.  What was the point and purpose of catching them in a contradiction?  What was supposed to happen at that point?  In what sense was he or was he not 'leading them in circles'?

5.  To what state of mind or end result was he trying to bring them?

6.  What does all this imply about truth and the search for it as Socrates understood them?  In other words, what does the search for truth mean in practice?

7.  What provoked the reaction that led to the indictment against Socrates?  Was there any justice in the charges brought against him -- namely, that he was teaching heretical views regarding the gods and that he was corrupting the youth of Athens?

8.  Socrates claimed that he 'taught' nothing, and that he 'knew nothing about the things into which he inquired.  Were these claims serious or genuine?  Were they true?  If so, in what sense?  If not, in what sense?

9.  Would Socrates have agreed that everyone has a right to his own opinion -- unexamined and unchallenged?

II.  STUDY GUIDE ON SOCRATES
 

Part I.  Plato's Euthyphro:  Socrates In Action.

1.  What was Euthyphro's business in the court of the king-archon?  What is his attitude toward himself and his business there?  How does he identify himself?  In what subject(s) does he claim to be an expert?  What attitude does he take toward Socrates?  How does that change over the course of the dialogue?

2.  How does Socrates present himself to Euthyphro, by way of contrast?   What is his explanation for being there?  What is his attitude toward himself?  What is (are) his attitude(s) toward Euthyphro?

3.  What does Socrates ask of Euthphro?  What is he interested in on the surface?  What does he seem interested in after the discussion has gotten underway?  What toward the end?  In other words, how serious is Socrates' interest in learning from Euthyphro?  [On this, see the handout, "Notes on Socratic Irony," and try to identify the three levels that Wolff talks about in the dialogue with Euthyphro.]  What is it that he really wants to learn from or accomplish with Euthyphro?
 

1.  What is the first definition of piety that Euthyphro gives (5d-e)?  What is unsatisfactory about it?  What sort of a thing is it that Socrates is looking for by way of a definition from Euthyphro (6d-e)?

2.  What is the second definition of piety that Euthyphro gives (7a)?  What turns out to be unsatisfactory about it?  Notice how the inadequacy of the definition is brought out: it turns out to be inconsistent with something else apparently more funamental that Euthyphro believes (7b-8e, also 6b-c).  In other words, one criterion of an adequate definition and true knowledge of something like piety is that it must not contradict anything else you believe.  Thus Euthyphro, on pain of being inconsistent with himself, is forced to acknowledge that definition #2 is objectively inadequate.  [On this matter, see the assigned essay by David Sanford, "Truth, Falsehood, and Socratic Self-Examination."]  As a result, for Euthyphro to maintain his confidence that he knows what piety is, he has to disclaim the definition and imply that it doesn't truly represent his knowledge.  Notice as well that, as the conversation proceeds, Euthyphro is progressively forced to discover and own up to what he doesn't know about piety, his ignorance about piety.  Nevertheless, not once does Socrates draw the conclusion that Euthyphro doesn't really know what piety is; rather is Euthyphro forced to dig deeper and deeper to get progressively more fully in touch with what little he knows deep within piety to be and how far his attempts to articulate that fall short of adequacy.

3.  What is Euthyphro's third definition (9e)?  What proves to be unsatisfactory about it?  Note how the inadequacy is brought out.  This is a difficult but important passage (10a-e), but the gist of it is that Euthyphro's definition hasn't identified the inner essence of piety, but has merely identified something that happens to be true of it but is external to its essence (namely the alleged fact that the gods love it).

4.  There next occurs an exchange of charges between Socrates and Euthyphro that the other is guilty of making the discussion go round in circles (11b-e, see also 15b-c).  It is easy to lose sight of what is going on here.  The issue is really a matter of whether Euthyphro can admit to the fact that he hasn't come up with a solid definition that will stay put so that it can definitely be put to the test, so that if it is found inadequate it won't be dragged back in at a later point.

5.  It is worthwhile to ask at this point what has been revealed of Socrates' intentions with Euthyphro?  It is clear that Socrates' intentions are not what Euthyphro first thought -- namely, that Socrates wants to receive and accept the 'answers' Euthyphro is so self-confidently ready to give.  Euthyphro's 'answers,' at least at this level, are not where a genuine knowledge of piety is at.  If it is anywhere, it lies much deeper, at a level Euthyphro has barely begun to get at by the end of the dialogue.  But that level is far beyond the level at which Euthyphro can be so self-assured of possessing the 'answers,' and in terms of which he would be  ready to prosecute his father for murder.  Socrates has certainly proven himself to be more adept than Euthyphro at analyzing the concepts involved and bringing out where Euthyphro's definitions go wrong.  That critical and analytical facility is easily taken to be a sign of knowing well what a principle like piety is (or at least a sign of knowing much more about it than the hapless individual whose definitions are found wanting)  But Socrates is concerned, I believe, with something deeper than this, and regards such a critical and analytical facility as merely a means to sort through the level of mere opinions and presumptions and reputations of supposedly knowing all about about what piety is and get beyond that level to what little we really know about piety itself.  That level is sometimes described as the level of "aporeia," which a man like Euthyphro experiences as a kind of bewilderment.  It is to be at the extremity of realizing in some sense that you know but being unable to put that knowledge or acquaintance into an adequate representation in verbal form.

6.  Where did the discussion go from there (11e on)?  In what respects did it progress further?  When Euthyphro finally breaks off at the end, to what extent was the inquiry a failure?  To what extent was it a success?  At the end, what attitude does Euthyphro hold toward Socrates?  What attitude does Socrates hold toward Euthyphro?
 

1.  What was the 'problem' in Euthyphro that Socrates was trying to address?  Given what Socrates says in the Apology, to what extent was this a common problem among his fellow Athenians?  Or rather, what was the common problem that Euthyphro shared with the other Athenians Socrates sought to 'take on'?

2.  How specifically did Socrates go about addressing and trying to solve this problem?  What were his strategies?  In what respect was his ironic posture necessary?

3.  What was the state of mind or end point to which Socrates tried to bring his fellow Athenians?  In what respects did he think it would improve them and make them better off, both individually and collectively?

4.  More general still, given what Socrates says in the Apology and given the picture of how he concretely went about doing what he did in the Euthyphro, what was Socrates' mission?  What was he trying to accomplish?

Part II.  Questions specifically occasioned by the Apology.

A.  What exactly were the charges of the indictment against Socrates?  What was it in Socrates' activities that provoked the reaction that led to the indictment?  Was there any justice to the charges brought against him?

B.  Between Socrates and Lycon, at least as portrayed in the video, "Barefoot in Athens," there seems to be a difference between two different meanings of what it is 'to question.'  Lycon claims that there are some things that a man simply must not question (doubt?).  Whereas Socrates maintains that an unexamined (unquestioned) life is not worth living.  The latter sense of examination or questioning seems to be something other than doubting.  Is it something different?  If so, what is it?

C.  Socrates claimed that he 'taught nothing, and that he 'knew' nothing (or very little) about the things into which he inquired.  Were these claims serious?  If so, in what sense were they serious or true?  If not, in what sense were they not serious or not true?   (On this matter, see "Notes on Socratic Irony," below.)

D.  Socrates says that there may be one respect in which he may be wiser than his fellow Athenians, and that is the respect in which he has come to know and acknowledge that he, like other men, is not wise.  What do you make of that claim?  Is it at all pretentious or inflated?

E.  Gather together all of the references in the Apology that Socrates makes to his mission or sense of calling (there are several) -- i.e., the special role he believes he has been assigned to play in relation to his fellow Athenians.  Summarize briefly in your own words what this role seems to be (try not to leave out any of its important facets).  What do you make of that role or mission?

F.  What can you conclude about Socrates' religious convictions from what he says in the Apology?

G.  What do you make of Socrates' response to the verdict?  And what do you make of his proposal of an alternative 'punishment'?  Would it be fair to say that he deliberately brought his death on himself by what he said and how he responded?  What wisdom, if any, lay in such a response?  What about his later refusal, in the Crito, to escape from prison and his reasons for refusing?

H.  Would Socrates have agreed that everyone has a right to his own opinion?  Think about it carefully.  Was he ever content with a person just having an opinion, or did he not always propose to examine the opinion to see if it was sound and true?  Might he not rather have claimed that the right is not to have an opinion of one's own, but rather the right is to examine and think any opinion through for oneself (though not necessarily by oneself)?  Indeed, strange as it seems to sound, he might say that everyone has a right and perhaps even a responsibility, an obligation, to have his opinions challenged and critically examined.

Part III:  How Does Socrates Represent Philosophy?

Assume, for the moment, that Socrates is an ideal embodiment of what philosophy is.  What characteristics can you identify in Socrates that can be generalized to hold true of authentic philosophy?  First list as many as you can for yourself, then compare your list with what follows.  Do not assume that this list is all inclusive.
 

A.  Readiness to question anything and everything, for the sake not of tearing down but for the sake of finding what is true, worthy, excellent, and just.

B.  Commitment to the search for truth above all other interests and loyalties.

C.  A rejection of all complacency, indifference, thoughtlessness -- all that stands in the way of the examined life.

D.  Disinterest in and freedom from the need to feel approval and be a success in the eyes of others.

E.  Passionate commitment to do what is known of what is right with all one's heart, without reservation, without compromise, and without fear of the consequences.

F.  Radically honest, with a concern to root out and let go of any pretense of knowing what one does not know, of possessing wisdom when one does not have it.

G.  Readiness to examine and test any idea that one may have, unafraid of finding it wanting or wrong, in order to discover the truth about it.

H.  Confidence that relentless inquiry will make progress, that it will lead to further insight, that it will eventually deliver one from wrong judgments, and that it will make one a better person.

I.  Commitment to logical argumentation and patiently reasoning things through (never jumping to conclusions when there is no sufficient warrant).

J.  Conviction that the knowledge of the deepest and most important things are to be found within a person and are not to be learned at second-hand from the outside.

K.  Commitment to having and encouraging each person think things through in the effort to find out what is true and what is not true for himself/herself, but not necessarily by himself/herself (for each person can so easily deceive himself/herself).
 
 

           Socrates is often said to be ironic, where irony involves a conflict between what is said (outwardly) and what is meant (inwardly).  The interesting question is exactly in what senses he is ironic.  Robert Paul Wolff, About Philosophy (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1976), p. 7, calls Socrates' irony "a verbal form of judo" in order to get inside peoples' defenses so that he could make them see -- really see -- that they were not truly wise. "The basic trick of judo is to let your opponent's force and momentum work for you.  Instead of launching a frontal attack, you let him swing or grab, and then you roll with his motion so that, in effect, he throws himself on the mat."

           Wolff goes on to describe (p. 7) irony as "a kind of speech or communication that assumes a double audience.  When a speaker makes an ironic statement, he seems to be directing it at one group of people.  This group is called the first, or superficial audience.  But in reality he is directing his remarks at a second audience, called the real audience.  His statement has a double meaning, and the trick of the irony is that the second audience understands both meanings.  The second audience knows that the first audience has misunderstood, so the irony becomes a private joke between the speaker and the second audience -- a joke at the expense of the first audience which never suspects a thing."   Though a person might suspect something who happens to be in a transition from being one sort of audience to being the other.

           Later (p. 9), Wolff remarks that at a deeper level, which Socrates' own followers sometimes don't really understand, there is another, double irony, whereby he genuinely means that he is ignorant:  "But Socrates believes that every man must find the truth for himself, and so his followers cannot shortcut their journey by learning the truth from Socrates any more than they could by observing the mistakes and confusions of Socrates' opponents.  In this deeper double irony, we . . . are the real audience, and both Socrates' opponent and his disciples are superficial or apparent audiences."

           Some useful, clarifying remarks about Socratic irony by other authors:

           From Maurice Merleau-Ponty, In Praise of Philosophy, translated by John Wild and James M. Edie (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1963), p. 38f:  "The irony of Socrates is a distant but true relation with others.  It expresses the fundamental fact that each of us is only himself inescapably, and nevertheless recognizes himself in the other.  It is an attempt to open up both of us for freedom.  As is true of tragedy, both the adversaries [both Socrates' accusers at his trial and Socrates himself] are justified, and true irony uses a double meaning which is founded on these facts.  There is therefore no self-conceit.  It is irony on the self no less than irony on the others.  As Hegel well says, it is naive.  The iroiny of Socrates is not to show less in order to win advantage in showing great mental power, or in suggesting some esoteric knowledge.  'Whenever I convince anyone of his ignorance,' the Apology says with melancholy, 'my listeners imagine that I know everything that he does not know.'  Socrates does not know any more than they know.  He only knows that there is no absolute knowledge, and that it is by this absense that we are open to the truth."

           From [Soren Kierkegaard,] The Journals of Soren Kierkegaard:  A Selection, edited and translated by Alexander Dru (New York, 1938), entry no. 1042:  "In those days one sophist after another came forward and showed that the misfortune was the lack of sufficient knowledge, more and more research was necessary, the evil was ignorance -- and then along came old father Socrates saying:  no, it is precisely ignorance which is our salvation."

           From [Soren Kierkegaard,] Soren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers, vol. II, edited and translated by Howard V. and Edna H. Hong (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1970), entry no. 1767:  "In what did Socrates' irony really lie?  In expressions and turns of speech, etc.?  No, such trivialities, even his virtuousity in talking ironically, such things do not make a Socrates.  No, his entire existence is and was irony; whereas the entire contemporary population of farm hands and business men and so on, all these thousands, were perfectly sure of being human and of knowing what it means to be a human being, Socrates was beneath them (ironically) and occupied himself with the problem -- what does it mean to be a human being?  He thereby expressed that actually the Treiben [i.e., "doings"] of those thousands was a hallucination, tomfoolery, a ruckus, a hubbub, busyness, etc., worth a zero in the eyes of the ideal, or less than zero, inasmuch as these men could have used their lives to concentrate upon the ideality."

           From Soren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, translated by David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1941), p. 289:  "To believe an ideality on the word of another is like laughing at a joke because someone has said that it was funny, not because one has understood it.  In such case the witticism might as well be left unsaid
. . ."

           From Micheline Sauvage, Socrates and the Conscience of Man, translated by Patrick Hepburne-Scott (New York:  Harper & Brothers, 1960), p. 97:  "If a disputant is wrong in taking his [Socrates'] profession of ignorance for a pretense ('You are in the habit of asking questions to which you know the answer,' says Charicles, colleague of Critias [in Xenophon's Memorabilia 1.2.36]) that is just because he has recognized Socrates as a past master in the art of aporia, the intellectual bewilderment into which fools and coxcombs are led by well planned questioning.  Here again he is in the line of the Sophists, but he, at least, has no ulterior motives.  . . .  Like these professionals in 'antilogy' [the art of proving the opposite, or at least of constructing apparent proofs to the contrary], Socrates aims at shattering the massive certitudes of men, like them he is a stimulator of doubt.  . . .  The fact is that they are ignorant of dialectic, being ignorant of the disputant, who for them is only an opponent to be reduced to silence, not a partner in a mutual search.  The mystifier is condemned to aim, in the uncertainty he arouses, at nothing but a personal triumph, whereas the ironist effaces himself behind the irony, now accepted as the common attitude of the participants in the dialogue, who detach themselves step by step from implicit judgments and hasty conclusions, freeing themselves from all false knowledge.  This puts souls at the disposal of the logos, which is both speech and reason."
 

IV.  'LEVELS OF KNOWLEDGE' WHICH SOCRATES' IRONY DISCLOSES

          Instead of 'levels of knowledge,' it would be more accurate to speak of different senses of knowledge, truth, and ignorance to which one becomes sensitive as one develops a capacity for recognizing and understanding what is going on with Socrates' irony.  In other words, as one becomes more aware of Socrates' irony, one becomes aware that what people take themselves to know is not necessarily what they know.  Their surface pretensions come to seem to be at odds with the reality that lies beneath the surface.  But, as the discussion of Socratic irony above makes clear, there are more than simply two levels of understanding/not understanding.  People at a lower (or less profound) level are generally unaware and uncomprehending of a higher (or more profound) level.  But people at a higher level are fully able to recognize and comprehend lower level(s) of understanding.  However, knowledge, ignorance, and truth in the most genuine sense for persons on any level is more or less determined by the definitions noted below for that level.
        Note how these three levels correspond to different stages or levels within the Allegory of the Cave.  Level one corresponds to the prisoner chained to the floor of the cave who mistakes the shadows projected on the wall for reality.  Level two corresponds to persons who have broken free of their chained condition and who are critically examining the representations paraded before the fire and being projected on the wall.  Level three corresponds to persons who have at least come to the opening of the cave and are becoming directly acquainted with reality for themselves.
 

        LEVEL 1                                         LEVEL 2                                         LEVEL 3
(uncritical/surface)                          (critical/latent)                         (post-critical/depth)

'Knowledge' ____________________________________________________________________
To possess an answer         (a) To possess an answer           Awakened intuitive
declared by an authority       with adequate justification.        acquaintance with 
(one who is supposed to     (b) To know the inadequacies    and deepening 
know).                                        of available answers.                   fidelity to trans-
                                                                                                                cendental truth.
 

'Ignorance'_______________________________________________________________
To lack an answer, which     (a) To lack an answer that       To not yet be
can be remedied by being     possesses adequate               awakened to Truth 
told by one who has it.           justification.                                in its transcendence 
                                                     (b) To fail to realize the             beyond mere
                                                      inadequacies of available       'answers.'
                                                      answers.

'Truth'___________________________________________________________________
A 'correct' answer, that         (a) An answer with adequate   Trancendental truth,
according to an authority.     justification.                                 can be known only 
                                                    (b) The inadequateness of        by an inner intuitive
                                                      the available answers.              acquaintance that
                                                                                                              reaches beyond the
                                                                                                              inadequacies of
                                                                                                              available answers.